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Abstract: What, if anything, is problematic about the involvement of celebrities in democratic 
politics? While a number of theorists have criticized celebrity involvement in politics (Meyer 
2002; Mills 1957; Postman 1987) none so far have examined this issue using the tools of social 
epistemology, the study of the effects of social interactions, practices and institutions on 
knowledge and belief acquisition. This paper will draw on these resources to investigate the issue 
of celebrity involvement in politics, specifically as this involvement relates to democratic theory 
and its implications for democratic practice. We will argue that an important and underexplored 
form of power, which we will call epistemic power, can explain one important way in which celebrity 
involvement in politics is problematic. This is because unchecked uses and unwarranted 
allocations of epistemic power, which celebrities tend to enjoy, threaten the legitimacy of existing 
democracies and raise important questions regarding core commitments of deliberative, 
epistemic, and plebiscitary models of democratic theory. We will finish by suggesting directions 
that democratic theorists could pursue when attempting to address some of these problems.   
 
 
1. Introduction  
The election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States has brought to the fore the 
role of celebrities in politics. This discussion only intensified with the suggestion that talk show 
host Oprah Winfrey should run against Trump in the 2020 election. Some hold that Winfrey’s 
celebrity makes her the ideal candidate to oppose Trump (Kohn 2018). For others, Winfrey’s 
nomination would be a disaster for American politics. For example, Thomas Chatterton Williams 
claimed, “The idea that the presidency should become just another prize for celebrities […] is 
dangerous in the extreme” (Williams 2018). Celebrity involvement in politics is not a new 
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phenomenon. In the 1980s, former Hollywood actor Ronald Reagan served as president of the 
United States. Similarly, fellow actor Arnold Schwarzenegger served as governor of California 
from 2003 to 2011.  
 
Concerns about the influence of celebrities in politics are also longstanding. C. Wright Mills, for 
example, criticized the central role that celebrity played in American life in the 1950’s, arguing 
that entering the world of celebrity was necessary to obtain a position of prestige and power 
(1957: 62). Neil Postman (1987), on the other hand, claimed that the increased link between 
celebrity and politics has transformed the political sphere into a branch of the entertainment 
industry – a problematic result, as it means candidates are selected for their presentation rather 
than for their political talent or viewpoints (Meyer 2002: 79).1 We might also worry that this 
emphasis skews political debate towards the interests of the rich and powerful, as they have the 
best access to celebrity networks (West and Orman 2002: 113).  
 
A number of theorists have explored the connection between celebrity and power (e.g. Meyer 
2002; Mills 1957; Postman 1987; Marshall 1997). Yet no one so far has examined this issue using 
the tools of social epistemology – that is, the study of the effects of social interactions, practices, 
and institutions on knowledge and belief acquisition. Here, we utilize these resources to develop 
a novel critique of celebrity involvement in democratic politics. Specifically, we argue that 
celebrity brings with it an important and underexplored form of power, epistemic power. 
Recognizing this link reveals new resources for identifying problems with celebrity involvement 
in democratic politics. We begin (§2) by outlining our account of the link between celebrity and 
epistemic power. We then (§3) draw on this account to develop a new critique of the role of 
celebrities in democratic politics and of the ability of democracies to live up to the ideals 
																																																						
1 See Street (2002) for a response to this worry. 
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articulated by democratic theory. We conclude (§4) by suggesting potential avenues for future 
work in political science and democratic theory in light of our analysis.  
 
 
2. Celebrity and Epistemic Power  
Before outlining the connection between celebrity and epistemic power, we will first say explain 
these two concepts. Many subtly different accounts of celebrity have been proposed. According 
to Boorstin’s influential definition, a celebrity is, “a person well-known for their well-knownness” 
(1962: 57). Alternatively, Rein, Kotler, and Soller, define a celebrity as someone, “whose name 
has attention-getting, interest-riveting and profit generating value” (1997:15). Van Krieken 
meanwhile defines celebrity as, “a quality or status characterized by a capacity to attract attention, 
generating some ‘surplus value’ or benefit derived from the fact of being well known (highly 
visible) in itself in at least one public arena” (2012: 10). While we do not intend to provide a full 
definition of celebrity here, these accounts reflect what we take to be a core feature of celebrity: 
the ability to capture attention.  
 
Many different groups of people are able to attract attention. To varying degrees, all government 
ministers are able to attract attention simply as a result of being important public figures. There 
may even be a sense in which celebrity is an integral part of political representation (Street 2002). 
For our purposes though, we intend to use ‘celebrity’ to refer to those to whom large amounts of 
attention is paid on subjects that are unrelated to their career, talent or expertise. For example, 
while George Clooney became famous as an actor, public interest in his life is not limited to his 
acting. Of course, many politicians also fit this description. Public interest in Barack Obama, for 
example, was not limited to his political role but also extended into his personal life. That said, 
we here use the term to pick out those who have become famous primarily for something other 
than politics. We make this stipulation to clarify the subject of this paper: we recognize that there 
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is a need to investigate the phenomenon of political representatives seeking to become 
celebrities, but it will not be our focus here. Rather, we will concentrate on celebrities who draw 
on their existing public profiles to become politicians or political campaigners: Donald Trump is 
one, as are celebrity activists, such as Bono and George Clooney, who use their position to 
campaign or express support for specific issues, parties or politicians.  
 
 
2.1 The Concept of Epistemic Power 
We will now explain the form of power that is our focus of concern, epistemic power.2 Epistemic 
power is the power one possesses in one’s capacity as an epistemic agent. Epistemic power is best 
understood in terms of two related abilities.3 First, the ability to influence what others believe, 
think, or know.4 A teacher, for example, possesses this ability in relation to her students. The 
second is the ability to enable and disable others from exerting epistemic influence. This is done 
by way of believing others (“giving them credence”) or by discrediting them. By trusting and 
hence validating a person or institution as a proper source, we enable that person or institution to 
have influence. For example, a teacher might praise a student’s mathematical ability leading 
others to believe that student when they provide answers. Here, the teacher has increased that 
student’s epistemic power. In contrast, by disabling a person or institution we preclude that 
person or institution from having influence. For example, we might publicly denounce a news 
outlet as ‘fake news’. When this public denunciation is successful the effect will be a decrease in 
the epistemic power of the news outlet. 
																																																						
2 The account of epistemic power given here is based on Geuskens (2018). 	
3	Dotson (2014) offers another account of epistemic power characterized in terms of power relations that engender 
epistemic privilege and domination. Our account follows Allen's (1999) understanding of power in terms of abilities 
or capacities (power-to), which is compatible with acknowledgment of non-dominating forms of power (i.e. power-
with). 




To summarize, our account of epistemic power is the following:  
 
Epistemic Power: A person has epistemic power to the extent she is able to influence what 
people think, believe, and know, and to the extent she is able to enable and disable others 
from exerting epistemic influence. 
 
Almost everyone possesses some degree of epistemic power, though some have more than 
others. There are different sources of epistemic power, some of which are entirely legitimate: an 
articulate person who possesses detailed knowledge of a particular subject may be able to 
influence what people believe simply by providing clear explanations to others. Institutional 
positions may also bring epistemic power. Professors, for example, possess epistemic power in 
virtue of their position as a professor, which grants them a special status as experts on their topic.  
 
Ideally, this institutional source of epistemic power will only be granted to those who deserve it. 
However, this will not always be the case. Someone could be granted an institutional position 
that brings epistemic power without possessing the relevant expertise. For example, a corrupt 
university could appoint an underqualified candidate to a professorship. Similarly, we can imagine 
cases where someone’s expertise in one area could allow them to bypass the normal procedures 
by which someone is granted the position of an expert. For example, a leading chemistry 
professor may use his prestige and profile to make public statements about how to treat cancer 
that are unrelated to his field of expertise (Ballantyne 2018). This professor uses his title and the 
platform it provides to exert epistemic power, whilst venturing into a scientific field that is not 
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his own area of competence. 5 Of course, people are allowed to give their opinion, but they 
should ensure that it remains clear that when they speak from  personal conviction rather than a 
position of expertise. The worry with this kind of procedure skipping is that there is a danger that 
people will be placed into institutional positions which bring epistemic power without possessing 
the relevant expertise.6  
 
 
2.2 Credibility  
One source of epistemic power is perceived credibility. The extent to which someone is perceived to 
be credible has a major impact on how much epistemic power that person possesses. Our focus 
will be on credibility excesses, cases where people are perceived to be more credible than they 
really are.  All else being equal, the more credible someone is perceived to be, the more power 
they have to influence what people think, believe, and know, and to influence who else can 
exercise epistemic influence. So, when someone possesses a credibility excess, they will possess a 
greater degree of epistemic power than is warranted by their epistemic abilities and expertise.7  
 
Do celebrities possess higher levels of perceived credibility than other people? The idea that 
celebrities are taken as reliable sources on topics for which they lack expertise is certainly familiar 
and seems to be accepted by a number of commentators. For example, Traub described singer 
Bono’s position in his political campaigning in the following way: “Bono offered decision makers 
																																																						
5 This case could also involve the manifestation of a professor as a celebrity, though this form of celebrity will  
depend in part on the epistemic power gained through being a professor.  
6 This point raises the question of what kind of procedures for the granting of institutional positions that bring 
epistemic power would be justified. We cannot address this question here but it is worth noting that even the best 
such procedures will not be fool proof and even the worst procedures may occasionally get things right.  
7 According to Medina (2011) credibility excesses can constitute a form of epistemic injustice.  
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an implicit bargain: do the right thing, and I'll say so in public. His currency was not just his fame 
but his credibility” (2008).  
 
The long-running use of celebrities in advertising and political campaigning might seem to 
provide further evidence for this link. However, despite the popularity of this technique, the 
connection between celebrity and credibility is a complex one. In a comprehensive meta-analysis, 
Knoll and Matthes (2017) found that celebrity endorsements had a positive effect on consumers’ 
attitudes, but no average effect on their behavioral intentions. The effectiveness of the celebrity 
endorser appears to depend on a variety of other factors, such as their gender (male celebrities 
performed better than females), their profession (actors outperformed models, musicians, and 
TV hosts) and the fit between celebrity and product (2017: 67).  
 
People’s willingness to accept celebrity endorsements is not restricted to trivial matters. In 2013 
Angelina Jolie (2013) wrote a widely read editorial in the New York Times about her decision to 
undergo a mastectomy after discovering she faced a high chance of developing breast cancer. 
Jolie urged women to investigate their own chances of developing breast cancer. An 
observational study found a 64% rise in American women undergoing the same genetic test in 
the fifteen days following the article’s publication (Desai and Jena 2016). Further, Freed et al.’s 
(2011) study into who parents view as credible sources of information on the safety of 
vaccinations found that, while parents were most likely to trust their doctor, 24% of parents gave 
some credibility to what celebrities had to say on the topic, with 2% giving celebrities a lot of 
credibility (Freed et al. 2011: 109). While these numbers may seem low, they do show that there 
are people who are willing to trust the word of celebrities on important matters like the health of 




Relatedly, celebrities have been claimed to have a major influence on political opinion. 
Garthwaite and Moore’s (2008: 358) study of the effects of Oprah Winfrey’s endorsement of 
Obama in the 2008 Presidential Primary estimated that Winfrey’s intervention was responsible 
for over one million votes for Obama. Similarly, a study by Jackson and Darrow (2005) into the 
impact of celebrity political endorsements among Anglophone Canadian youths found that 
celebrity endorsement influenced the extent to which respondents were willing to endorse certain 
political opinions. However, as the authors note, the link between celebrity endorsement and 
political opinion is a complex one, dependent on an interaction between the celebrity, audience, 
and endorsed opinion (Jackson and Darrow 2005: 94). Veer et al.’s (2010) study of the effects of 
celebrity endorsement among UK voters also found these endorsements to be influential but far 
more so amongst those who spent little time thinking about politics. Harvey’s (2017: Ch. 4) 
research people’s credibility ratings of celebrities and politicians found that in most cases the 
ratings between the two groups were indistinguishable. Finally, Becker’s (2010: 112-116) research 
into the effects of political endorsement found that they were effective with young people 
(especially women) and Democrats, especially on social rather than economic issues. These 
results suggest clear evidence for a link, albeit a complex one, between celebrity and perceived 
credibility in the political domain.  
 
One important factor in the effectiveness of a celebrity endorsement is whether the respondents 
are fans: as Jackson and Darrow (2005) noted, while some celebrities were capable of influencing 
their entire sample of Canadian political science students, others were only effective over fans of 
their music style. This suggests that some celebrities possess a credibility excess only amongst 
their fans. One way to explain this is that admiring someone in some way can often lead us to 
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admire him or her in other ways as well.8 Another, complementary explanation is that the fan-
celebrity relationship is one of ‘intimacy at a distance’ (Horton and Wohl 1956: 215; van Krieken 
2012: 83), where interaction with celebrities involves coming to know them, “in somewhat the 
same way they know their chosen friends” (Horton and Wohl 1956: 215). This may lead people 
to attribute greater credibility to celebrities than they would to unknown strangers.910   
  
In summary, there is good reason to think that some celebrities will be subject to credibility 
excesses in the political arena among certain groups of people, especially those who admire and 
are familiar with them, and those with little interest in politics. The processes by which these 
credibility excesses are constructed will take place without the conscious awareness of the 
person making the credibility judgement. However, the celebrity-credibility connection is 
complex, and highly context-dependent. In the next section, we will explain a more general 




Another source of epistemic power is attention. Celebrities are often the focus of people’s 
attention. This forms a core part of the economic value of celebrity, especially in an information 
rich society. Of course, celebrities often also have economic value stemming from their talents. 
However, the economic value that celebrities possess by virtue of being a celebrity comes from their 
ability to capture attention. Importantly, the attention people pay to celebrities distinguishes them 
																																																						
8	Archer and Matheson (Forthcoming) suggest that this spreading tendency of admiration can be seen as a specific 
form of the halo effect.	
9	Knoll and Matthes’ (2017) meta-analysis provides some support for this explanation, as they found actors to be the 
most effective endorsers and suggest this may be down to the stronger relationships actors have with consumers. 	
10	Both processes may stem from the affective power possessed by celebrities. Investigating the significance of this 
power in relation to politics would be a worthwhile project but we cannot do so here.	Thanks to Manuel Dries, 




from ordinary people: celebrities are paid attention to in a way that ordinary people are not (van 
Krieken 2012: 60). They are, in Marshall’s words, “a voice above others” (1997: xlviii). Moreover, 
the attention paid to celebrities often outweighs that paid to politicians or to those with relevant 
expertise. As the former United States Senator Arlen Specter said, “When Hollywood speaks, the 
world listens. Sometimes when Washington speaks the world snoozes” (cited in Ross 2011: 5).  
 
Politicians also pay attention to celebrities in a way they do not to other people. Activist Han 
Shan explained his movement’s decision to utilize celebrity campaigners in the following way: “if 
a celebrity backs your cause, then immediately the public and the media and even policy-makers 
will sit up and pay attention” (cited in Duncombe 2007). A number of high-profile celebrities 
have leveraged this fact. For example, when Natalie Portman became concerned about the Israel-
Palestine conflict, she contacted the Queen of Jordan to see if she could help (Traub 2008). Non-
celebrities are unlikely to possess this kind of access to the attention of those in power. 
 
Being the focus of attention is a source of significant epistemic power for celebrities. This point 
may not be immediately obvious, as being the focus of attention does not necessarily enhance 
credibility. For example, American terrorist Ted Kaczynski (aka the Unabomber) captured 
attention for his anti-technology manifesto Industrial Society and Its Future by stating that he would 
continue his bombing campaign until it was published in a major newspaper. However, the 
attention this brought to Kaczynski’s views is unlikely to have increased many people’s 
perceptions of his credibility.  
 
Nevertheless, this case shows why attention is a distinct source of epistemic power from 
credibility. Attention by itself is unlikely to change people’s credibility perceptions about ideas 
they are already aware of. But it can alert people to ideas they had not heard of before. For those 
disposed to find Kaczynski’s ideas appealing, exposure to these views may well lead them to start 
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accepting these ideas. While attention may not boost the speaker’s credibility, it does provide a 
platform for one’s testimony to be heard. This is crucial, as it does not matter how credible 
someone would be perceived if he or she does not have a means of being heard in the first place. 
Having a platform provides new opportunities to influence what people think, believe, and know. 
In other words, attention can increase one’s epistemic power without one’s perceived credibility 
increasing.   
 
Being the focus of attention can also work to redirect attention towards others, with celebrities 
using interviews or social media to encourage people to pay attention to other people’s ideas. For 
example, during a 2016 appearance on US television on the Today Show, Robert De Niro 
encouraged people to watch the controversial anti-vaccination film Vaxxed.. In this case, De Niro 
did not use his platform to get his own testimony accepted. Rather, he directed attention towards 
the testimony of people who would not have received anywhere near the same levels of attention 
without his assistance. In doing so he enabled others to exert epistemic influence, and hence 
increased their epistemic power. 
 
Another way in which being the focus of attention can be a source of epistemic power is that 
through providing people with the tools to set political agendas. Agenda setting is the process by 
which the media shape which issues are deemed to be of political importance. McCombs and 
Shaw (1972) developed their theory of agenda setting based on their studies of US presidential 
elections, arguing that:  
 
In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an 
important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but 
also how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a 




According to McCombs and Shaw, the media do not simply reflect political reality, they also 
structure and shape it. The more attention the media gives to a certain issue, the more likely people 
will consider it important. As Cohen says, the media, “may not be successful much of the time in 
telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think 
about” (1963: 13).11 The ability to shape the political agenda is therefore also a source of 
epistemic power for those to whom attention is paid. It enables them to influence the topics 
people think about and, as a result, what people come to believe and know. 
 
One way celebrities set the political agenda is through traditional forms of media. As Harvey’s 
(2017: 65) research shows, a celebrity’s intervention in a political cause can raise the media 
visibility of that cause. Additionally, the rise of social media has allowed celebrities to reach large 
numbers without having to navigate the gatekeepers of the traditional media. Social media also 
allows celebrities and politicians to influence the shape of the coverage of the news media 
(Parmelee and Bichard 2011; Parmelee 2014). A simple indicator of social media’s power is that 
in 2017 the estimated combined print and online daily newspaper circulation in the United States 
was 31 million on weekdays and 34 million on Sundays (Pew Research Center 2018). In 
comparison, Donald Trump has 57.2 million Twitter followers, at the time of writing (13th 
January 2019). Trump utilized this platform to great effect in his 2016 Presidential Election 
Campaign, gaining far more attention than his opponent Hillary Clinton. Trump’s posts were 
retweeted 6000 times on average, compared to Clinton’s average of 1500 (Pew Research Center 
2016). As several commentators observed, this provided Trump with extraordinary power to set 
the news agenda. In the words of Trump’s former Press Secretary Sean Spicer: “whatever he 
tweets is going to drive the news” (cited in Borchers 2017). A large-scale analysis of mainstream 
																																																						
11 See Watson’s (2018) discussion about the importance of agenda-setting and narrative shaping in  the ‘Brexit’ 
referendum in the UK.  
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and social media coverage of the 2016 election campaign, highlighted the success of Trump’s 
agenda setting. Although the study found that coverage of both candidates was mostly negative, 
it “largely followed Donald Trump’s agenda” (Faris et al. 2017: 5).  
 
In summary, attention is a source of epistemic power for celebrities. First, attracting large 
amounts of attention provides a platform for their testimony to be heard. Second, it allows them 
to redirect people’s attention to other sources of testimony. Third, it allows them to set the 
political agenda. Of course, celebrities are not the only people to garner attention in the political 
arena. Leading politicians receive attention even if they were not previously celebrities, and 
economists, sociologists, psephologists, geographers and other experts all receive attention on 
issues relevant to their expertise. This attention is a source of epistemic power as well. And these 
experts may even achieve a level of celebrity themselves. The difference is that, in these cases, 
epistemic power is granted to people with some legitimate claim to it. In the case of politicians, it 
is focused on those making the decisions and asking them to account for their actions; in the case 
of experts, attention is given in light of their expertise. This is not the case with celebrities, who 
receive attention even when they may lack any relevant expertise. 
 
3. Celebrity and Democracy 
As the above shows, celebrities possess a substantive amount of epistemic power that is not 
linked to expertise. This section examines how recognition of this fact introduces concerns 
regarding the role of celebrities in politics. In particular, we explore the ways in which existing 
theories of democratic legitimacy fail to recognize the importance of the epistemic power 
possessed by celebrities (from here: ‘celebrity epistemic power’) and show that the challenge 
facing any actual democracy attempting to meet the standards of legitimacy set out by these 




3.1 Democratic Theory 
We begin by considering how celebrity epistemic power may interact with two standard 
approaches to democratic theory, deliberative and epistemic democracy. These terms denote a vast 
array of distinct views, and we will not here attempt to examine epistemic power alongside each. 
Nor will we survey other influential theories such as pluralism, agonism, or elitism.12 Rather, we 
will identify some core commitments of selected standard approaches, broadly conceived, and 
analyze how they overlook the importance of celebrity epistemic power. Moreover, we will argue 
that celebrity epistemic power creates challenges for  grounding the legitimacy of democracy by 
appealing to these democratic ideals. We end with a brief discussion of an emerging democratic 
theory, namely Green’s (2009) plebiscitary democracy. While plebiscitary democracy may avoid 
some problems facing the traditional accounts, it is perhaps even more vulnerable to some of the 
concerns associated with the workings of celebrity epistemic power. But first, a brief introduction 
to deliberative and epistemic theories of democracy. 
 
Deliberative models of democracy ground the legitimacy of democratic rule in public debate (i.e. 
the public giving and receiving of reasons) informed by citizens’ mutual respect for others as 
moral equals. In contrast to aggregative models, which interpret moral equality as the 
requirement of giving one, equally weighted, vote to each citizen, deliberative democracy pairs 
equal formal influence with deliberative ideals that are intended to protect equal opportunity to 
participate in and influence political outcomes. Protecting this equal opportunity to influence is 
taken to have both procedural and substantive requirements. Procedurally, participants are 
required to advance claims solely on the force of argument and reason, and not trade on power 
inequalities (Knight and Johnson 1997: 288). In Habermas’ words, “no force but that of the 
																																																						
12 Proponents of classic pluralism include Dahl (1967) and Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) while Mouffe (1992) and 
Connelly (1991) advocate agonistic models of democracy. Elitist theories of democracy are advanced by Putnam 
(1976) and Bottomore (1993). 
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better argument is exercised” (1975: 108). Substantively, asymmetries of power or resources 
should not unfairly (dis)advantage participants in deliberation; participants should not be 
prevented from deliberating as a result of a lack of resources or power and should not be subject 
to coercion. 
 
In response to accusations that these ideals are unrealistic and overdemanding, some have 
developed a related, systemic model of deliberative democracy that aims to retain the original 
deliberative values while allowing for more expansive notions of deliberative processes. Systemic 
models acknowledge a variety of interactions and associations as forms of deliberation which can 
be treated as component parts of a larger deliberative system.13 Such systems are characterized by 
the distribution of deliberation across components, and a division of deliberative labor. As a 
result, no individual component or interaction must itself meet the full and rigorous criteria for 
deliberative democracy. 
 
Pure deliberative models ground the value and legitimacy of democracy in its relation to these 
deliberative ideals, independently of the epistemic value of the outcome. Conversely, epistemic 
models of democracy suggest that in addition to protecting equal opportunity to influence 
political outcomes (i.e. its procedural fairness), democracy’s legitimacy lies in part in its epistemic 
value. Estlund, for instance, argues that the typical dichotomy between procedural fairness and 
(epistemic) quality of outcomes is a false dilemma (2003: 69).14 Rather, appropriately rigorous 
democratic procedures can be described as having (modest) epistemic value, tending to ‘track 
truth’ to a sufficient extent to ground democratic legitimacy.  
																																																						
13 These can include, for instance, ‘everyday talk’, non-profit organizations, the media, judicial and legislative bodies, 
and advocacy groups (Mansbridge 2012).  
14 By procedural fairness, Estlund does not mean procedures that protect equal opportunities to influence (which 
could be achieved via a coin toss), but rather procedures that support fair treatment (as in the procedures involved in 




Recent work in this area has revisited the core epistemological assumptions, developing further 
criteria for legitimate democracy.15 Peter (2007) for instance, offers an alternative (pure) account 
of Estlund’s rationalist epistemic proceduralism. Rather than evaluating democratic outcomes 
against a procedure-independent standard of correctness, we can think of knowledge as the 
product of a deliberative process and focus our efforts on defining “the conditions that knowledge 
producing practices should satisfy” (2007: 341).16 These conditions support epistemic fairness, 
and can include “criteria that regulate public deliberation at the fact-gathering and analysis stages 
of the processes of policy formation” (2007: 344).17 
 
Similarly, Young (2000) characterizes democracy as a form of practical reasoning aimed at finding 
correct and just solutions. While different social groups have access to different forms of situated 
knowledge, it is a mistake to think that enjoying ‘epistemic privilege’ - in the form of having first-
hand knowledge of the experience of subordination - yields epistemic power. Marginalized 
groups may lack perceived credibility or suffer from deficits of attention. Young therefore 
advocates inclusion as a normative ideal of democratic communication. Inclusion describes not 
only formal opportunity to participate in deliberation, but also effective opportunity to influence 
others and to contest dominant notions of the common good that underpin deliberations. This 
effective opportunity could be read as enabling appropriate degrees of perceived credibility and 
paying attention to all participants. 
 
																																																						
15 See Gledhill (2017) and Peter (2007, 2013). 
16 Peter points to Longino’s (2002) related account of the production of scientific knowledge, including her 
requirement for “tempered equality…of intellectual authority, a criterion that warns of illegitimate associations 
between social, political, and economic privilege and power, on the one hand, and epistemic privilege and power, on 
the other” (2007: 343).  
17 Epistemic fairness takes into account when unequal opportunities to contribute are requirements of justice. 
Forthcoming	in	Perspectives	on	Politics.	Please	cite	final	version	
 17	
In addition to deliberative or epistemic accounts of democratic legitimacy, there are mixed 
theories that draw on the insights of both in various ways. Some theorists propose drawing on a 
deliberative stage to produce a considered set of options that are then voted on. This model is 
defended on epistemic grounds, wherein incorporating a deliberative stage in the generation and 
vetting of possibilities produces a list of options that is better able to capitalize on the epistemic 
power of aggregative methods.18 Landemore (2013) for instance, advocates an inclusive form of 
deliberation characterized by cognitive diversity.19 When combined with a ‘stopping rule’, such 
deliberation is best able to produce intelligent answers to collective problems. 
 
 
3.2 Analysis of Democratic Theory and Celebrity Epistemic Power 
We turn next to the question of how celebrity epistemic power creates challenges for those 
wishing to ground the legitimacy of democracy by appealing to these democratic ideals. We 
introduce three points of critique: namely the illegitimate ability to set political agendas, the 
relative immunity from familiar checks on power, and the undermining of democracy’s epistemic 
qualities as a result of the disconnect between expertise and epistemic power. Importantly, we do 
not argue that celebrity epistemic power always works to undermine democratic goals or 
epistemic value. Particular uses of this power could compensate for systemic failings elsewhere. 
Moreover, we do not suggest that celebrity epistemic power poses the biggest problem for 
democracy as compared to more familiar threats tied to inequalities of wealth, education, or 
leisure. We aim primarily to highlight existing democracies’ vulnerability to unchecked epistemic 
power, which we have argued celebrities tend to enjoy, and therewith to show important lacunae 
in how deliberative and epistemic theories of democracy understand attention and influence.  
																																																						
18 See Goodin (2017) and Landemore (2013). 
19 By cognitive diversity, Landemore means a variety of perspectives, interpretations, heuristics, and predictive 




3.2.1 Agenda Setting 
Our first point concerns the potential for celebrity epistemic power to influence the subject of 
deliberation: the greater attention celebrities attract could translate into greater attention for the 
causes or issues they find important, thus influencing the public agenda. 
 
Agenda setting can refer to the setting of the objects of public interest (i.e. what people think 
about), but also the attributes or framing of a debate (i.e. the terms in which people think about 
the subject). Much research has demonstrated the influence of the news media on both levels of 
the public agenda and thus as constituting an important subject of democratic concern 
(McCombs 2002: 3). As McCombs writes:  
Influencing the focus of public attention is a powerful role, but arguably, influencing the 
agenda of attributes for an issue or political figure is the epitome of political power. 
Determining the way that an issue is framed – setting the ground rules for deliberation, if 
you will – can significantly influence the ultimate outcome. (2002: 8) 
While celebrity power to attract and direct attention arguably does not (yet) rival that of the news 
media, it can function in similar ways to influence the objects of public debate and their 
attributes. That is, it can transmit the salience of a subject, or of particular attributes of the 
subject, through volume of attention.  
 
For example, it is likely that the celebrity profile of individuals subjected to sexual harassment in 
Hollywood played a large role in the recent rise in awareness of the issue of sexual harassment 
reflected in the #metoo and #timesup movements. A pervasive, but previously seldom 
discussed, issue has in a short time, come to occupy a more substantive position on the political 
agenda. As Brooke notes, “[#metoo] brought the idea of sexual harassment and assault into the 
public consciousness” (in Seales 2018). It has also been described as challenging the dominant 
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‘crisis’ framing of sexual assault and related policies (Abrams 2018). Placing sexual harassment on 
the political agenda is a positive achievement and could be described as an instance of celebrity 
epistemic power working to supplement the credibility and attention deficits that have wrongly 
kept this issue off the agenda for so long. But, while the phrase ‘me too’ was first used to 
highlight the prevalence of sexual assault by activist Tarana Burke in 2007, it only became the 
focus of widespread attention when high-profile celebrities, such as Alyssa Milano, began to use 
it.20 The way this issue has (finally) been brought to the fore, i.e. via the attention-directing 
dimension of celebrity epistemic power, seems contrary to central deliberative ideals of fairness 
and equal opportunity to influence. As such, this example illustrates how celebrity epistemic 
power has influenced the public agenda in a way that, at least on one level, weakens the 
legitimacy of existing democracy and shows just how far away existing democracies are from 
meeting deliberative ideals.    
 
Granted, neither the news media nor celebrities fully determine the public agenda. The influence 
of news media partially depends on an individual’s level of media reliance or need for orientation 
(McCombs 2002). However, as Yang and Stone (2003) show, the media agenda is also able to 
indirectly influence others via their interpersonal connections with those who do follow the news 
media (described as ‘opinion leaders’). This raises two concerns: first, to the extent a celebrity 
echoes the news media’s agenda, they may function as an ‘opinion leader’ in ways that further the 
news media’s agenda-setting power, and second, the special attention-directing power of 
celebrities likely amplifies this indirect means of agenda-setting.  
 
Such methods of agenda-setting are problematic for grounding a democracy’s legitimacy in the 
deliberative ideals of procedural fairness and the equal standing of citizens. Procedurally, 
																																																						
20 See the related discussion in Archer and Matheson (Forthcoming). 
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viewpoints may be  excluded not as a matter of having been formally rejected, but because our 
limited capacity for attention has been devoted to some issues over others, resulting in a de facto 
setting of the agenda. Regarding standing, it seems celebrities likely enjoy a higher effective status 
in deliberative contexts (as ‘opinion leaders’) in virtue of their epistemic power. Consequently, 
any democracy seeking to appeal to ideals of procedural fairness and equal standing to ground 
their legitimacy ought to find a way of addressing these power imbalances.  
 
 
3.2.2 Substantive Equality and Checks on Power 
Plausibly, we ought to add epistemic power to the list of inequalities deliberative democrats ought 
to be concerned with. In particular, inequalities in epistemic power seem likely to threaten the 
(substantive) requirement that participants have equal opportunities to influence others. While 
the simple existence of an inequality in power is not itself a threat to a deliberative democracy’s 
legitimacy, substantive controls are required to  prevent this inequality leading to unequal 
opportunities to influence deliberation. And, such controls do seem to be lacking with celebrity 
epistemic power currently lying outside the familiar mechanisms for checking power. First, unlike 
with economic power, there are no formal mechanisms aimed at regulating or monitoring 
celebrity contributions to political campaigns whether in the form of explicit endorsements or 
indirect political commentary via the media (social or traditional). Second, there are problems 
with relying on informal mechanisms such as public debate as a way of identifying and contesting 
power. Such measures may prove impotent in the case of celebrity epistemic power. To the 
extent that an issue becomes affiliated with a celebrity debate on that issue becomes entwined 
with publicity for its advocate. Thus, attempts to challenge celebrity statements work to draw 
further attention to the celebrity. In other words, the attention tied to publicity can bolster, rather 
than check, a source of celebrities’ epistemic power. Recognition of a similar point has led some 




Additionally, the deliberative process should be driven by engagement with, and reflection on, 
reasons rather than the imposition of power. Thus, the political process ought to be protected 
from coercive or manipulative influences, but also unequal opportunities to influence that derive 
from wealth, educational, or other social inequalities.21 Deliberative theorists are keen then to 
distinguish between these improper sources of unequal influence and proper sources tied to the 
persuasive power of good argument and evidence.22 However, as our analysis of the sources of 
epistemic power shows, these forces cannot be neatly separated – the very ‘force’ of reasons can 
be tied to workings of epistemic power. In such cases, non-epistemic reasons (such as being the 
subject of greater attention) influence the extent to which some reasons are deemed legitimate or 
some reasoners are thought credible. To return to the previous #metoo example, it is largely 
because of the collective action of a handful of celebrities that widespread sexual harassment and 
assault in the workplace – and particularly the entertainment industry – has come to be taken 
seriously.  While not speaking on issues outside their expertise,  plausibly the actors who 
advanced the #metoo movement enjoyed greater perceived credibility than women generally 
receive when reporting sexual harassment. Moreover, their capacity for persuasion was not tied 
to greater abilities to reason or present evidence (proper sources of influence), nor to economic 
or educational resources. And, such influence seems of a different type than the forms of 
manipulation enabled by economic or educational inequalities. Instead, recognition of celebrity 
epistemic power reveals the ready notion of autonomous influence, understood as deliberation 
resulting from “free reflection on what one takes to be relevant reasons” (Kolodny 2014: 310) 
may be too simplistic. Again, in this case, epistemic power may have helped advance democratic 
																																																						
21 To the extent that the political system cannot be insulated from these factors, deliberative democracy may require 
these socio-economic inequalities in society be reduced (Brighouse 1996). See also Cohen (2001) and Kolodny (2014) 
22 See Brighouse (1996: 120, 127) and Knight and Johnson (1997: 281) 
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goals (i.e. social equality), though this will not always be the case.23  Thus, to the extent that 
deliberative democratic theory is ignorant of this form of informal influence, it will be ill-
equipped to determine when no force ‘but that of the better argument’ is in play, and hence when 
deliberative outcomes are legitimate. There are two points to draw from this: First, the prospects 
for deliberative democratic theory are tied in part to whether its proponents can offer a satisfying 
account of how to distinguish and control for this influence. Second, the phenomenon of 
celebrity epistemic power presents a real challenge to anyone seeking to ground the legitimacy of 
any actual democracy by appealing to deliberative democratic theory.  
 
Defenders of systemic accounts of deliberative democracy might reply that there are ways in which 
democracies could respond to the challenges posed by celebrity epistemic power. First, even if 
celebrity epistemic power risks violating deliberative ideals in traditional deliberative interactions 
(as argued above) the systemic approach suggests that other institutions or associations could 
counter this influence and thus neutralize its anti-deliberative effects. Moreover, this countering 
could work as an opportunity to assert valuable epistemic norms and practices and thus drive the 
re-valuing of an important deliberative virtue.24 Finally, by not relying on specific, static, 
institutions and defined checks and balances to define deliberative democracy, the systemic 
approach might be less vulnerable to the criticism that celebrity epistemic power largely bypasses, 
or falls outside, the traditional means of protecting against undue influence. While not accounted 
for explicitly, a systemic approach retains the possibility of identifying countervailing practices or 
norms that serve to check celebrity epistemic power where it threatens to undermine the 
deliberative system.  
																																																						
23 As Kolodny notes, the social equality relevant for the democratic goal of being ruled by none is not satisfied when 
claims to means are given equal concern (2014: 299) 
24 Mansbridge et al. argue, for instance, that parliamentary heckling seems anti-deliberative at the micro-level but 
could be defended as promoting virtues of contestation and questioning that work in other contexts to support 




It may be true that any anti-deliberative effects of celebrity epistemic power may be neutralized 
by other systemic components, or even work to prompt the re-assertion of valuable deliberative 
norms. There is evidence, for example, for thinking celebrity influence in the domains of health 
and science has prompted experts to publicly respond to pseudo-science and to emphasize the 
value of scientific literacy.25 However, while scientists have increased engagement and publicly 
supported valued epistemic norms, it is unclear whether the scientific experts are winning. This is 
despite the well-established and widely endorsed role of science in society. This gives reason for 
worry that the deliberative systems in the political domain, which are less well-established or 
endorsed, may be comparatively vulnerable.  
 
It is also important to consider what kinds of practices or institutions could counter any anti-
deliberative effects of celebrity epistemic power, as it is not obvious how this could be done. For 
example, even if relevant experts respond to celebrity comments, their response could work to 
establish an issue as a subject of public debate. Responding to issues selected by celebrities 
enables celebrities to set the agenda. These worries relate to the ability to identify and manage 
(anti)deliberative components within a democratic system, though again, in theory, it may be 
possible to achieve this. The task then for proponents of systemic accounts of deliberative 
democracy is to acknowledge the ways in which celebrity epistemic power could interact with 




25 See, for instance, Timothy Caulfield’s Is Gwyneth Paltrow Wrong About Everything? (2015),  and the charity Sense 




Celebrity epistemic power thus poses a potential practical challenge for democracies striving to 
achieve the ideals of deliberative democratic theory by insulating the deliberative process from 
power inequalities, particularly as active efforts to contest celebrity statements could increase 
their power. In addition, deliberative theories of democracy need more robust notions of 
autonomous influence that can account for the ways in which attention and perceived credibility 




One important feature of celebrity epistemic power is that it frequently extends beyond the 
celebrity’s legitimate area of expertise. That is, celebrities are routinely perceived as credible on 
subjects outside their relevant expertise. The problem is not simply that some individuals have 
greater epistemic power than others, as this may be entirely legitimate. Scientists, for instance, 
may be due more epistemic power than anti-vaxxers on the subject of vaccine safety, due to their 
relevant expertise and credentials. The problem is that epistemic power should be tied to relevant 
expertise if democracy is to be defended on its ability to generate better choices. The decoupling 
of epistemic power and expertise then creates additional problems for those seeking to ground 
the legitimacy of a democracy by appealing to epistemic theories of democracy.  
 
First, the gap between expertise and epistemic power can threaten a democracy’s potential for 
truth-tracking. For rational epistemic proceduralists such as Estlund, to the extent that celebrity 
epistemic power undermines the tendency of democratic procedures to track the truth, the 
epistemic value of democracy could be undermined. And there seems particular cause for worry 
on this issue given the nature of celebrity epistemic power. Granted, this is not to say that 
celebrities will necessarily lead us further from truth, but to the extent that celebrity epistemic 
power is not tied to systems of credentials, training, and expertise which are meant to aid truth-
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tracking, it is more difficult for someone like Estlund to claim the democratic procedure is 
sufficiently epistemically rigorous to support claims of legitimacy.26  
 
This point is also worrisome for pure epistemic proceduralists like Peter and Young. On Peter’s 
account, democracy contributes to the production of knowledge. Again, strict equality of 
epistemic power is not necessarily desirable, as we can also recognize the distinct expertise that 
social groups have in certain areas. Catala (2015) makes a similar point when she argues that 
dominant majorities ought to epistemically trust a minority group on a relevant issue in virtue of 
their expertise. That is, on some issues, minority groups are epistemically privileged such that 
special, rather than equal, status is due (2015: 431-434).27 Thus, pure epistemic proceduralists also 
have reason to be concerned that epistemic power aligns with relevant expertise – namely 
epistemic privilege tied to one’s social group. As noted in the above discussion concerning 
rationalist accounts, celebrity epistemic power is not the product of, nor is reliably connected to, 
relevant forms of expertise, and thus is worrisome. To the extent that pure epistemic 
proceduralists characterize democracy as a site for the production of knowledge, unchecked 
celebrity epistemic power that contradicts or crowds-out relevant expertise threatens democracy 
at a more fundamental level.28 Moreover, Turner warns that despite the growing appearance of 
celebrity diversity, “celebrity still remains a systemically hierarchical and exclusive category” 
largely under the control of media industries driven to “to operate this economy in the service of 
																																																						
26 Other qualities, such as wealth, or education, could also be associated with being perceived as credible on subjects 
outside one’s expertise and thus also a cause for concern if they undermined Estlund’s epistemic democratic 
procedures. Estlund’s theory may also be threatened by other epistemic deficits such as voter ignorance or 
misinformation campaigns. Thus, celebrity epistemic power is only one of several potential threats to the epistemic 
function of a democracy. However, celebrities possess a particularly effective combination of perceived extra-expertise 
credibility and attention that could increase their epistemic effects relative to others. 
27 Kolodny (2014: 309) also argues that in non-ideal conditions, social equality may be advanced by granting a 
threatened group greater opportunity to influence political decisions. 
28 However, it is possible that on some issues, a celebrity will have the relevant knowledge. This does not lessen the 
effect of celebrity influence on subjects where they lack expertise. 
Forthcoming	in	Perspectives	on	Politics.	Please	cite	final	version	
 26	
their own interests”(2006: 157). Alongside the obvious issue here regarding substantive equality, 
there is also the concern that such dominant interests translate to a homogenization of 
perspectives and interpretations that undermine the epistemic value of Landemore’s deliberative 
component. 
 
Finally, this credibility-creep could be problematic for those seeking to appeal to systemic 
accounts of democratic legitimacy. Mansbridge et al. (2012) describe the related defect of 
decoupling as a possible threat to a deliberative system. Decoupling occurs when “parts of the 
system become decoupled from one another in the sense that good reasons arising from one part 
fail to penetrate the others” (2012:23) such as when politicians fail to acknowledge scientific data 
on climate change. The spreading features of celebrity epistemic power represent the 
complementary defect (encoupling), where reasons arising from one part of the system fail to 
remain isolated. Celebrities are taken to have expertise even when they lack credentials and stand 
outside the peer communities that help support legitimate expert authority. In many ways, 
celebrity epistemic power is distinctly contrary to the systemic components that support healthy 
expert contribution. Thus, given the potential for celebrity epistemic power to lessen the 
tendency of democratic procedures to track truth, or to undermine democracy’s contribution to 
the production of knowledge, it should be of concern to those aiming to ground democracy’s 
legitimacy in its epistemic value.  
 
 
3.3 Plebiscitary Democracy 
We end this analysis with a discussion of an emerging model of democracy that reduces the 
emphasis on the traditional deliberative and epistemic values noted above, namely Jeffrey Green’s 
(2010) theory of plebiscitary democracy. Green argues that theorists must acknowledge that very 
few citizens in today’s existing democracies are empowered to influence politics via expression of 
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preferences – that is, via their voice – but are better described as spectators in the democratic system. 
He rejects the view, however, that this condition is a lamentable one of powerlessness. Rather, 
via recognition of three central ‘shifts’ in focus he develops an alternative, ocular paradigm, that 
identifies a new source and object of democratic power. First, rather than aiming to shape 
legislation, plebiscitary democracy is concerned with leaders: that is, the character and conduct of 
political leaders are of primary rather than secondary, instrumental, importance. Second, rather 
than exercising power via speech, citizens are empowered via the gaze: a “hierarchical form of 
visualization that inspects, observes, and achieves surveillance” (2010: 9). Finally, the third shift 
replaces the critical ideal of autonomy with that of candor. This is the institutional (rather than 
personal) requirement that leaders should not have full control over their appearances and 
presentation. The people ought to secure “control of the means of publicity” (2010: 14) such that 
public appearances are spontaneous rather than scripted, rehearsed, or managed and are thus 
“worthy of being watched” (2010:15).  
 
Green’s emphasis on the gaze as the new site of people’s democratic power partly aligns with 
Keane’s (2009) account of monitorial democracy. For Keane, contemporary democracy is being 
redefined as a system of complementary monitory measures that work to identify and challenge 
power, rather than a system of popular self-rule (2009: 706). Enabled by a media revolution that 
has produced a communicative abundance, "[e]very nook and cranny of power becomes the 
potential target of 'publicity' and 'public exposure'” (2009: 740). These monitoring bodies can be 
thought of as providing material for Green’s plebiscitary gaze and thus as a source of 
empowerment. 
 
As plebiscitary democracy does not aim to produce decisions, it avoids many of the concerns that 
applied to epistemic and deliberative models of democracy. However, celebrity epistemic power 
raises problems for this view, too. First, while Green identifies the spectator gaze as a site of 
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empowerment, our analysis of celebrity epistemic power and attention suggests this relationship 
is more fraught. Increasing scrutiny and surveillance of celebrities can be cast as increasing the 
attention directed towards them and thus increasing their epistemic power.29 But, Green might 
object, this result is less damaging for his model, as the related agenda-setting effects of attention 
that worried us on other accounts of democracy lose their bite on the plebiscitary model. In the 
world of issueless politics that characterizes plebiscitary democracy,	the object is not to decide on 
options (i.e. engage with an agenda), but to observe the leader’s character and personality (2010: 
45).  
 
However, this only deepens the concern. Today’s celebrities are well equipped to manage their 
image and thus control the public’s knowledge, not (only) of issues and facts, but of the 
celebrity’s personality and individual qualities. Many have ready access to public relations 
consultants and media experts, and moreover, as private individuals, celebrities can retreat behind 
calls for privacy to more fully control information about themselves. The private world not only 
lacks some of the powerful monitoring capacities of the political realm – for example, being 
subject to Freedom of Information requests, or being required to disclose sponsorship sources – 
it also enjoys certain protections explicitly against such monitoring.30 Furthermore, celebrity 
publicity does not seem subject to Green’s ideal of candor. While the public may value 
authenticity in celebrities, this does not translate to an institutional call for the public to control 
the means of celebrity publicity. Without this institutional dimension, celebrities retain control 
and are able to create the appearance of authenticity (Click et al. 2013). Thus, on plebiscitary 
democracy, celebrity epistemic power to control the public’s knowledge of them as individuals is 
																																																						
29 To the extent that scrutiny, surveillance, and attention create celebrity, Green’s emphasis on the gaze in the 
political sphere could result in greater celebritization of politicians.  
30 See for instance criminal convictions related to hacking personal phone messages as part of the News International 
phone hacking scandal (Halliday 2014). 
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increased (via attention) while avoiding the institutional requirement for candor and the checking 
potential of the gaze. 
 
In sum, celebrity epistemic power poses a variety of challenges to a democracy’s ability to realize 
its normative ideals. This power threatens provision of equal opportunities to influence political 
outcomes in both procedural and substantive respects. The source of celebrity epistemic power is 
of particular concern given its potential to come apart from relevant expertise and hence derail 
productive and epistemically fruitful deliberative practice, including the knowledge-production 
capacities of democracy. Moreover, the deliberative and epistemic theories of democracy 
examined here were shown to be lacking in their respective abilities to address the workings of 
celebrity epistemic power.  
 
The above analysis represents only an initial examination of the relationship between celebrity 
epistemic power and selected models of democracy. There are additional models that merit 
analysis, and further interactions within our selected theories to consider. One such issue 
concerns how celebrity epistemic power relates to the problem of “constituting the demos” 
(Goodin 2007: 40).  In particular, celebrities can, and do, engage in international deliberation: 
they are free to endorse, comment and exercise influence at a global level. Examples include 
American actors Susan Sarandon, Lena Dunham, and Mark Ruffalo expressing support for 
Jeremy Corbyn in the UK’s 2017 snap election and British singer Adele endorsing Hillary 
Clinton. Celebrity epistemic power, then, could result in illegitimate forms of deliberative 
influence that undermine democratic legitimacy. Finally, more work is needed to determine the 
relative magnitude of the threats posed by celebrity epistemic power to existing democracies as 
compared to other phenomena such as economic inequality, apathy, corporate interest lobbying, 
or educational deficits. This work will require substantive empirical research to determine the 




While we have identified a number of serious concerns, we do not take any of these points as 
proving fatal to the legitimacy of existing democracies or to the related democratic theory. 
Rather, we take this discussion to have revealed gaps that could help inform future developments 
in democratic theory and practice. In particular, if Green and Keane are correct that 
contemporary democracy is increasingly characterized by spectatorship and a politics of publicity, 
democratic theorists ought to pay special attention to celebrity epistemic power.  
 
4. Future Directions 
The above analysis aimed to scrutinize the interaction between celebrity epistemic power and 
democratic ideals, and thereby indicate themes that future democratic theorizing could pursue on 
this issue. In this section, we offer some speculative comments concerning the directions this 
theorizing could take. 
4.1 Responsibility 
One avenue of inquiry is to revisit the subject of responsibility and the importance of robust 
moral-epistemic norms for checking celebrity epistemic power. We’ve identified three immediate 
domains for which such norms seem essential. The first includes the role of media companies in 
facilitating and shaping what gets attention and thus (among other things) in setting the political 
agenda. There is a case to be made that those companies have a moral and social responsibility to 
oversee who gets to use their services – in particular, they have responsibility to prohibit the 
spreading of falsehoods or “fake news”. Some companies seem to have begun to recognize this 
responsibility. For example, conspiracy theorist Alex Jones was banned from YouTube, Apple, 
and Facebook in August 2018 (Newton 2018).  
 
Our point is not that Jones is a celebrity (in fact he may not on our definition) but rather to point 
to this as an example of a case where media companies have recognized and responded to a 
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misuse of epistemic power. Given this, it seems reasonable for these companies to also consider 
the ways in which celebrities might misuse their epistemic power. Of course, this leaves the 
question of what counts as a misuse. While some cases are clear, we need a more substantive 
standard to determine what counts as a misuse of epistemic power. A future project for political 
scientists, alongside social epistemologists, is to investigate whether such a standard can be 
determined.  
 
The second domain of responsibility concerns celebrities’ responsibility for the use of their 
epistemic power. Their responsibilities would involve, most minimally, doing adequate research 
before they speak out about a topic. This might involve contacting relevant experts and checking 
the credentials of those experts with other experts, such as when Bono consulted Professor 
Jeffrey Sachs at Harvard to learn more about developing world economics (Harvey 2017: 46). 
 
The final domain of responsibility concerns ordinary citizens. Citizens effectively give celebrities 
their epistemic power by paying attention to them and, as Van Krieken (2012: 73) notes, citizens can 
stop paying attention at any point. This relation resembles the role of citizen voters in 
empowering government that Beerbohm (2012) discusses. For Beerbohm, citizens share 
responsibility for their country’s actions in virtue of their relation as voters. He builds on this 
point to develop an ethics of justified political belief and to map the contours of this 
responsibility. Beerbohm’s views could theoretically be expanded to acknowledge that ordinary 
citizens endow celebrities with their epistemic power and are thus partly responsible for its 
existence and exercise. His ethical program could similarly be extended to citizen responsibility 
for directing attention.  
 
In order to combat the unwarranted epistemic power of celebrities, we must therefore hope that 
citizens, celebrities, and/or media companies, upon seeing their responsibility in creating this 
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power, will help to control its use. One avenue for investigation, then, is for political scientists to 
garner insights from contemporary epistemology about which intellectual and moral virtues 
should be developed in citizens, celebrities, and media companies.31  
 
Whether this can be done by citizens, celebrities, or media companies individually or must be 
done collectively is a question that requires further investigation. However, even if an adequate 
solution is found, it seems somewhat naïve to think that each or any of these groups will in fact 
do this. This presents a serious challenge for political scientists and highlights the limits of this 
line of research. 
 
4.2 Celebrity Creation 
 
A different direction to pursue concerns the creation of celebrity. It is important to recognize 
that celebrities are not inevitable; as products of profit-driven media industries, political 
ideologies, and technological developments, celebrity is a contingent category that could 
theoretically be dissolved. The history of the American film industry provides a nice example of 
the contingent nature of celebrity culture.  In the beginning of the 20th Century The Edison Trust 
monopolized the industry and prevented actors from gaining celebrity status by banning artistic 
credits and denying licenses for films featuring star-making performances (Wu 2010: 61-73). 
Thus, one approach is to challenge the forces that produce celebrities and eliminate (or reduce) 
the very existence of celebrity epistemic power. Conversely, one could advocate exploiting this 
category rather than eliminating it. Perhaps the better strategy is to promote the celebritization of 
experts and diverse voices in order to counter the effects of an exclusive celebrity population and 
																																																						
31 Watson (2018: 100-101) makes this point with respect to the media and citizens in the context of the 




to help foster informed deliberation. Physics professor Lawrence Krauss advocates a related 
strategy, claiming that scientists have a responsibility to inform the public and are at least as 
worthy of helping to steer public debate as other celebrity figures (2015: 32). Others, including 
Keane (2009), for instance, worry that media saturation can negatively affect democracy by 
overloading citizens with demands for their attention. “Profusion breeds confusion”, thinks 
Keane, and can lead to escapism, disaffection, or cynicism (2009: 746-7). 
 
4.3 Ethics and Politics of Attention 
Implicit in the above is a focus on attention and publicity. In this way, our analysis shares 
similarities with Green’s insights concerning the role of publicity (or candor) in democratic 
theorizing. Green gave candor – that is, the people’s institutional control over the means of 
publicity – a central place in his democratic theory. He also emphasized the people’s gaze as an 
alternative source of power in place of their voice. Future research in democratic theory could 
build on these insights in light of the connections we have drawn between epistemic power, 
attention, and credibility. Green’s concern could be framed as one regarding the allocation of 
epistemic power – namely, for the reallocation of the power to influence belief, to citizens via 
control over the means of publicity. But we ought also be concerned with how epistemic power 
is used – that is, how citizens use their epistemic power to allocate credence. Moreover, these 
distributive and ethical questions might be fruitfully framed in terms of attention as well as in 
terms of publicity.  For instance, concerns about opportunities to influence deliberation via speech 
could be supplemented with opportunities to be the focus of attention. One possible outcome of 
this study is to consider publicity and attention as a subject of justice.  
 
A related line of research concerns the ideal of equal opportunity for influencing political 
outcomes. This ideal presumed a clean distinction between the legitimate influence of reason and 
evidence and the illegitimate influence of economic or educational advantage. But as discussed in 
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section 3.2.2., celebrity epistemic power represents a form of influence that resists description in 
these terms. Thus, theorists could revisit the ideal and explore ways to address forms of influence 
that trade on attention and perceived credibility. 
 
4.4 Expertise and Power 
A final direction to pursue would be to investigate exactly what kind of link should exist between 
expertise and epistemic power. It is important for political scientists and political theorists to 
acknowledge both the epistemic power celebrities have and that this power is often 
unaccompanied by relevant forms of expertise. Thus, the ideal distribution of epistemic power 
would be one in which someone’s epistemic power with regards to a particular subject was 
proportional to their expertise. However, such an approach runs the risk of leading to a a society 
governed by technocratic experts. An ongoing project in political science and political theory is to 
investigate how the seemingly anti-democratic phenomenon of expertise can be legitimately 
incorporated into democratic decision-making. For example, Alfred Moore (2017) recently 
defended a form of ‘critical elitism’ in which expert authority can be made democratically 
legitimate by being made subject to public contestation. Our discussion can contributes to future 
theorizing on this topic first by emphasizing the importance of epistemic power and second by 
raising the question of whether there is a legitimate role for those whose epistemic power is 
disconnected from expertise, such as celebrities, to play in this process.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Celebrities are involved in politics and increasingly so. We have set out to show that celebrities 
have a distinctive form of epistemic power that is not connected to expertise. We have focused 
on this form of epistemic power because we think that in the future, it is a form that political 
scientists ought to investigate more. Importantly, we intend our contribution to act as a 
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framework for future research rather than for it to have the final word on these complex and 
difficult matters.  
 
We end with a word of warning, given recent events, for political parties that wish to profit from 
celebrity epistemic power. While many politicians become celebrities by being politicians, there 
are also those celebrities who harness their celebrity to become politicians – e.g. Ronald Reagan, 
Arnold Schwarzenegger, Donald Trump. One explanation for this is that they are already the 
focus of attention, which saves the party some work. However, this risks the celebrities 
themselves becoming the ones who control the party’s line. The case of Donald Trump may 
illustrate this as his epistemic power seems to have become greater than the Republican Party’s in 
terms of agenda setting. It is troubling when a person with no political experience not only lands 
the highest political office in the world, but also radicalizes the direction of that party. We think 
that investigating unwarranted and unchecked epistemic power will be helpful for understanding 
the particular influence that celebrities can have in politics and for avoiding further such 
problems with democracy. Moreover, such investigations could ground wider study of the ways 
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